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Introduction 
Almost 20 percent of the people in the work 
force are union members. Just in terms of 
numbers, trade unions are an important influence 
in the labor market and in the U.S. economy. 
Further, unions are widely believed to play a 
major role in determining workers' standard of 
living and how work is done and in affecting 
firms' profitability. Freeman and Medoff (1984) 
recently presented evidence suggesting that 
unions affect labor markets in a variety of ways. 
The beneficial effects of unions include protec- 
tion for older workers, reduced quit rates, 
reduced earnings inequality,  and increased pro- 
ductivity. Unions might adversely affect profits 
and stock prices and might increase the number 
of workers laid off in cyclical downturns, as well. 
Although the impact of unions on 
these measures of economic performance has 
been studied, the majority of research on unions 
concerns how they affect compensation. Freeman 
and Medoff (1984) show that unions increase 
Mnge benefits, and there is a large body of 
empirical evidence that suggests unions raise the 
relative wages of their members.' In addition, 
unions have been found to affect the wages of 
nonunion members, although the direction and 
magnitude of this effect is ambiguous. Despite 
the attention focused on how unions affect 
wages, little attention has been paid to how this 
change in the relative cost of unionized labor af- 
.......................................... 
I  1  See  Parsley (1980) for a review of  this voluminous literature. 
fects employment-clearly  an important part of 
assessing the welfare costs and benefits of union- 
ism.* (By "welfare costs," we mean social or 
aggregate costs and not simply private costs and 
benefits to union members.) If  unions succeed in 
raising wages only at the cost of massive employ- 
ment reductions, as some analysts believe is the 
case, the welfare implications are radically differ- 
ent than if  wage increases could be achieved with 
little or no impact on aggregate employment. 
This study examines whether 
changes in unionism affect the aggregate level of 
employment in the economy, and in particular, 
whether an individual who lives in a standard 
metropolitan statistical area (SMSA)  where unions 
are rare or weak is more likely to be employed 
than an individual who lives in an area where 
unions are strong. 
Whether or not unions have a 
harmful effect on employment is also important 
to analysts of regional unemployment differences. 
Murphy (1985), found that differences in sensitiv- 
ity to demand conditions in the product market 
and in wage differentials are vital in determining 
regional differences in unemployment rates. Since 
unions have been found to affect both of these 
variables, differences in the extent or impact of 
unionism could be important in understanding 
regional unemployment rate differentials. 
12 
There have been studies of the relative wage effect of unions 
across industries, occupations, and race and gender groups. 
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In fact, Freeman and Medoff's 
study (1984) suggests that unemployment rates 
are 1.0 percent higher in areas with a high degree 
of unionism relative to low unionism areas. 
However, since they also fail to find any correla- 
tion between the degree of unionism and the 
employment rate, a further, more explicit analysis 
of this question seems to be necessary to deter- 
mine what effect, if any, unions have on aggre- 
gate and regional employment rates. 
I. Previous Literature 
Most studies of the employment effects of unions 
have been on the industry level.3  Industry or firm 
studies, however, may overestimate the disem- 
ployment effect of unions, because they ignore 
the fact that some or all of the displaced workers 
may become re-employed in other industries or 
firms. Consequently, these studies cannot provide 
estimates of the net or aggregate employment 
effect of unions. 
Lewis (1963 and 1964) provided 
the first analysis of the relative wage and 
employment effects of unions on an aggregate 
basis. Lewis divides the economy into a union 
and a nonunion sector. Industries with a rela- 
tively high degree of unionism, like manufactur- 
ing and mining, are part of the unionized sector, 
while those with a low degree of unionism are 
part of the nonunion sector.*  Using time series 
data, Lewis estimates whether changes in relative 
employment levels across these two sectors can 
be attributed to differences in the average union/ 
nonunion wage premium and to the average per- 
cent unionized. His results suggest that unions 
have a significant negative effect on relative 
employment levels and man-hours worked. 
Pencavel and Hartsog (  1984) 
recently updated and extended this seminal 
work. They failed, however, to find any consistent 
negative impact of  unionism on man-hours. In 
fact, they conclude that the hypothesis that union- 
ism depresses man-hours can be accepted only 
for the late 1920s and early 1930s. This basic 
result is not sensitive to whether the employment 
and wage effects of unions are estimated with 
Lewis' reduced form model or with a structural 
industries into two sectors ignores the effects of 
unions within these sectors and, thus, may not 
yield good estimates of the overall effect of 
unions on employment and wages. Further, the 
absence of controls for changes in labor quality 
across sectors means that these studies might 
overestimate the impact of unions on wages and 
underestimate the effects on employment. In 
other words, if firms respond to the union wage 
demands by hiring for higher-quality labor, then 
"quality-adjusted wages will not rise as much as 
measured wages6  Since firms may substitute 
skilled for unskilled workers, the effect on total 
demand for labor could differ from the effect on 
a particular type of labor.' 
Kahn (1978), Kahn and Morim- 
une (1979), and Holzer (1982) provide cross- 
section estimates of the effects of variations in 
the extent of union membership across SMSAs 
on employment, hours worked, and unem- 
ployment stability. In these cross-section stu- 
dies, the fraction of employed workers in an 
SMSA  who are union members is used as a mea- 
sure of union strength, because it is believed 
that unionism affects all workers in the same 
labor market, not just those in the same indus- 
try. Workers who may be displaced because of 
union wage demands are likely to seek 
employment not just in that industry, but 
throughout the local labor market. Studies with 
detailed cross-section data, either from the Cur- 
rent Population Survey (CPS) or the Survey of 
Economic Opportunity (SEO), offer better con- 
trol for individual characteristics and for labor 
market variables that affect employment. These 
cross-section studies avoid some of the aggrega- 
tion problems that crop up in aggregate time 
series studies, and thus, are preferable. 
Nevertheless, results of these 
cross-section studies are somewhat inconclu- 
sive. Kahn (1978) finds that annual hours 
worked are significantly reduced for nonunion 
females, but not for nonunion males; these 
effects did not differ by race. Holzer (1982), 
.......................................... 
model that they developed.5 
The structural model of  the labor market that is used by Peccavel 
These results might be ambiguous  and Hartsog (1984) was developed to test for the wage and 
because aggregate data are not suited to testing  employment effects of unions without assuming that employment  is uni-  I 
the employment effects of unionism. Aggregating  laterally set by employers or that  the union wage premium is exogenous.  I  It should also be noted that  their model also differs from that estimated 
.......................................... 
3  See  Lewis (1963) lor a review of some of these industry studies 
4 
The union sector was made up of mining, construction, 
manufacturing, transportation, communication, and public utilities; 
the nonunion sector was made up of all others, except military and 
government relief. 
by Lewis (1964) in that they use only the percent organized variable to 
capture the effect of unionism and not the estimated union wage 
premium. 
6 
The potential importance of  these biases can be seen by the fact 
that the estimates of the quality-adjusted union relative wage 
effect differ substantially  from those derived in cross-section studies. 
7 
See  Pencavel and Hartsog (1984, p. 216) for a further discussion 
of  these limitations. 
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however, finds a consistently significant nega- 
tive employment effect for young white males 
and a negative but insignificant effect for older 
white males and black males. His results are 
sensitive to the sample year and to the specifica- 
tion of the estimated equation. 
The difference in these results 
may be due to differences in sample years or 
the fact that Kahn (1978) examines annual 
hours worked, while Holzer (1982) looks at 
employment levels. Given this, it may be useful 
to examine in greater detail whether the disem- 
ployment effect of unionism occurs primarily 
through employment levels or through the 
number of hours worked by those who remain 
employed. Further, since Pencavel and Hartsog 
(1984) also found that the employment effect of 
unionism varies across time, it would seem that 
an analysis using recent data would be a valua- 
ble contribution to the literature. 
11. Theory 
The simple one-sector neoclassical model yields 
fairly straightforward predictions about the 
effects of unionism.8 As seen in figtire 1, if 
unions increase wages above the competitive 
wage level  Wo  to  W,,  , employment (or hours 
worked) falls from Eo to E,, . The reduction in 
ment depends on the elasticity of labor demand 
and on the size of the union wage premium. 
With a fixed labor force, or inelas- 
tically supplied labor, this reduction in 
employment translates into an equal increase in 
the level of involuntary unemployment. In this 
case, E, -E,,  workers would like to work, but are 
unable to gain employment at the new union 
wage rate. Thus, in the context of a simple one- 
sector model with a fixed labor force, the 
employment and unemployment effects of 
unions are of equal magnitude. If  labor is elasti- 
cally supplied however, the effect on measured 
unemployment of an increase in union wages is 
somewhat more ambiguous. In this case El - E,, 
workers want employment, but cannot get it at 
the union wage. These workers show up as 
unemployed only if they continue to engage in 
search for the rationed E,, jobs. As Welch (1974) 
points out, determining how many of these 
workers will remain on the labor force requires 
a model of probabilistic search behavior. Con- 
sequently, this simple model yields ambiguous 
predictions about the effect of unions on the 
measured unemployment, but predicts unambig- 
uously that employmentwill fall. The effect on 
total employment, E, , in this model depends 
upon the impact of unions on wages and the 
elasticity of labor demand in the economy. 
--  - 
Employment Effects on Unions  (1)  aET= vw  - 
ET 
where 
w  = the percentage changes in wages, 
7  = the elasticity of labor demand. 
A fundamental problem with this 
simple one-sector analysis is that it does not 
allow for the possibility that there are nonunion 
workers in the economy. Consequently, this 
simple model may be useful in analyzing the 
FIGURE  1 
employment in this simple model results from 
profit-maximizing firms moving up their labor- 
demand curves in response to union wage de- 
mands.9 The size of the reduction in employ- 
8 
Much of the theory used in this section was developed in the 
minimum wage literature by Welch (1974), Gramlich (1976), and 
Mincer (1976). These models provide a useful framework for analyzing 
the employment and unemployment consequences of the imposition of a 
wage rate that is above the market-clearing value. 
......................................... 
9 
It should be noted that this result depends on the assumption that 
in the face of  union wage demands, employers iemain on their 
labor-demand curves when setting employment. Although this model of 
employment determination is in widespread use, recent work by Mc- 
Donald and Solow (1981) and Pencavel and Hartsog (1984) has called 
its validity into question. An employment rule that allows firms to set 
employment after the wage is given may not be  Pareto-optimal,  because 
it leaves workers and firms off the contract curve. An optimal employ- 
ment rule would involve the joint determination  of employment and 
wages by labor and management. Under such a rule, movements in 
union wages need not be associated with movements along the labor 
demand curve and may, in fact, imply a positive association between 
wage increases and the level of  employment. Clearly, if bargaining takes 
this form, there will be no aggregate employment loss resulting from 
unionism. 
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employment effects of  unions within a firm, but 
will be of limited value in studying the industry- 
wide or aggregate consequences. Multi-sector 
models that allow for the presence of a nonun- 
ion sector have been developed by Johnson and 
Mieszkowski (1970) and Diewert (1974). 
These general equilibrium mod- 
els examine the impact of unions on nonunion 
wages in a world with varying factor intensities. 
Within the minimum wage literature, Welch 
(1974), Mincer (1976), and Gramlich (1976) 
have also developed multi-sector models to 
study the employment and unemployment 
effects of legislated wage floors, but they have 
typically assumed that factor intensities do not 
vary across sectors. 
In a multi-sector model, an 
increase in wages in the union sector again 
leads to a reduction in employment in the 
unionized sector, as employers move up their 
labor demand schedules. The higher wage  W,, , 
creates an excess supply of workers who are 
now willing to work in the nonunion sector if 
the nonunion wage is also W,,  . The addition of 
these workers to the nonunion sector shifts out 
the supply curve in that sector.I0  This increase in 
the supply of labor in the nonunion sector will 
alter either wages or employment in the nonun- 
ion sector, and most likely both.ll 
Effect of Unions on Nonunion Employment 
will not fall enough to prevent total employ- 
ment from falling. Falling wages in the nonun- 
ion sector cause workers with high reservation 
wages to withdraw from the labor force, thus 
causing total employment to decline. Only if  the 
supply of labor is inelastic, will total employ- 
ment remain fixed. 
In the two-sector model, the 
effect of unions on total employment still 
depends upon their impact on average wages in 
the economy. The change in average wages is a 
weighted average of the percentage change in 
the wages in the union and nonunion sectors: 
where 
k  = percent of employment that is 
unionized, 
w  = percentage change in wages in 
sector i. 
Given this, the effect on aggregate 
employment of an increase in union wages (or 
in the percent of the work force that is organ- 
ized) will depend on the impact of such a 
change on nonunion wages. Unless the increase 
in union wages is offset by a reduction in non- 
union wages such that: 
(3)  w,  z  -k w,, 
1-k 
average wages, and hence employment, will 
change. As seen in  figure 2, the actual change in 
nonunion wages depends, in part, upon the 
number of workers displaced from the union 
sector (the shift in the supply curve to the non- 
I  I 
union sector) as a result of the increased union 
I  I  wage. Given this increased supply, equilibrium 
is reestablished by falling wages, which increase 
Eo En  E  demand and cause some workers to withdraw 
FIGURE  2 
As  seen in figure 2, the increased 
supply of workers to the nonunion sector tends 
to depress wages in that sector. Unless the elas- 
ticity of labor supply is zero, nonunion wages 
10 
Gramlich (1976) has noted that if union jobs go to workers 
with the lowest reservation wage, then the supply curve for 
workers in the nonunion sector shifts out only in that region above the 
reservation wages of  the displaced workers. If jobs are assigned ran- 
domly, then a parallel shift in the labor supply curve occurs. 
from the labor force. Consequently, the aggre- 
gate employment effect of unions depends 
upon the amount of increased demand and 
Mincer's (1976) analysis implies that the existence of  a  1  1  union premium may cause some workers to prefer being 
unemployed but in the queue for union jobs to being employed in the 
nonunion sector. Consequently, a union wage premium may cause labor 
to flow from the nonunion to union sector. He  has shown that a net flow 
of labor  from the union to nonunion sector occurs if the elasticity of 
demand  !or  labor exceeds the turnover rate in the union sector. As noted 
by Holzer (1982), given the low turnover rates in the unionized sector, 
this condition will, in general, be met. 
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reduction in supply in the nonunion sector that 
results from the drop in wages. 
It can be shown that in a two- 
sector model with constant factor intensities, the 
changes in nonunion wages will be a function 
of the elasticity of labor supply, e, the elasticities 
of labor demand in the union, v ,, , and 
nonunion sectors, v  , the percent unionized, k, 
and the change in union wages, w,, .I2  Thus: 
From equation (4) we see that 
unless the elasticity of !abor supply is zero (e  = 
0), nonunion wages will not fall enough to pre- 
vent average wages from rising and total 
employment from falling. Falling wages in the 
nonunion sector cause workers with high reser- 
vation wages to withdraw from the labor force, 
thus causing total employment to decline.l3 
Since previous research has found that unions 
tend to organize industries where the elasticity 
of labor demand is low, it is interesting to note 
that the greater the elasticity of labor demand in 
the nonunion sector relative to the union sector, 
the smaller the drop in nonunion wages, and 
the smaller the aggregate employment loss.14 
Using equations (I), (2), and (4), we can 
express the change in total employment as a 
function of the union wage change: 
where 
A = (vu  -  e)  [jl -  k) + t  w,] 
+ kt (7, -  n,)w,. 
See  Welch (1974, p. 304, equation [6]),  for derivation of a  12  similar result under the assumption that demad elasticities 
do not vary across sectors. 
It is possible that the existence of a union wage premium 
may actually draw more workers into the labor force than exit 
because of the depressed nonunion wage rate. This will occur, however, 
only if the turnover rate exceeds the elasticity of demand for labor. As 
noted earlier, this condition is unlikely to hold in the union sector. 
1  14 See  Freeman and  Medofl (1984) 
The higher the elasticity of 
supply, t,  or elasticity of demand in the union 
sector, vU,  or the greater the percent organized, 
k, the greater the disemployment effect asso- 
ciated with an increase in union wages. As the 
percent organized rises, more workers are in the 
union sector, and hence, are affected by the 
increase in union wages. However, if  labor 
supply is inelastic, total employment will 
remain fixed. 
In a general equilibrium model 
with variable factor intensities, the effect of 
unions on wages in the nonunion sector, and 
hence total employment, is ambiguous. If the 
unionized sector is the intensive sector then, as 
shown in Johnson and Mieszkowski (1979), 
both the substitution and the scale effect will 
result in a reduced capital/labor ratio in the 
nonunion sector, and hence, a reduction in the 
marginal product of labor and wages. 
However, with a capital-intensive 
unionized sector, nonunion workers will get 
higher wages if  the scale effect is greater than 
the substitution effect and lower wages if  the 
converse is true. In either case, increases in 
union wages or in the percent of the labor force 
that is unionized tends to be associated with an 
increase in average wages and a drop in total 
employment, as long as labor supply is not 
completely inelastic. 
The theoretical models discussed 
in this section imply that increase in either the 
percent unionized or in the union/nonunion 
wage differential can lead to a reduction in 
aggregate employment. The size of the disem- 
ployment effect will depend, in part, upon the 
elasticity of labor supply, where the more elastic 
the supply, the greater the reduction in 
employment. As seen in equation (5),  the 
employment effect of unionism depends upon 
the extent of union strength, which is a function 
of both the union wage premium and the per- 
cent of the work force receiving it. Based on this 
theory, we would expect an inverse relationship 
between union strength and employment. We 
would also expect this effect to be small, if the 
elasticity of labor supply is near zero. 
111. Empirical Results 
To test for the employment and unemployment 
effects of unions, we used data from the 1983 
Current Population Survey (CPS) Earnings File 
and Census data on SMSA  characteristics. This 
data set was chosen, in part, because it contains 
detailed personal characteristics for each 
respondent, which allow us to control for dif- 
ferences in worker quality. In addition, it con- 
tains earnings and union membership data 
across individuals in each SMSA. To ensure a 
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sufficient sample size in each of the 44 SMSAs  in 
our sample, we combined the survey responses 
for each month over the year, yielding a sample 
of 104,409 observations.~5 
To examine the disemployment 
effect of unions, we initially looked at the effect 
of unionism on the probability of an individual 
in the population being employed. Because 
displaced workers from the unionized sector 
may either become unemployed or withdraw 
from the labor force, the employment and 
unemployment effects of unionism need not be 
the same. Since the distinction between unem- 
ployed and not-in-the-labor-force may not be 
pronounced, and since some of those displaced 
by unions may withdraw from the labor force, 
the probability of being employed might be a 
better measure of the "true" disemployment 
effect of unionism than the probability of being 
counted as unemployed. An additional benefit 
from focusing on employment status is that we 
can examine whether unionism has a different 
effect on the likelihood of getting part-time 
work than on getting full-time work. These 
effects may differ substantially if unionism 
affects the length of the workweek for those 
who remain employed. 
As shown in section 11, the effect 
of unionism on employment is a function of 
both the percent organized and the union wage 
premium. Consequently, the measure of the 
effect of unionism that we used is the product 
of the percent of employment in an SMSA  that is 
unionized and the union/nonunion wage dif- 
ferential.16 This index is similar to the Kaitz 
index, which is widely used to examine poten- 
tial disemployment effects of a legislated min- 
imum wage increase. It appears that unions 
impact aggregate employment via their effect on 
the average cost of labor. The distortion in labor 
costs due to unionism is the change in wages- 
that is, the union wage premium times the 
number of workers who receive that wage." 
Previous cross-section work by 
Holzer (1982), Kahn and Morimune (1979), and 
Kahn (1978) has implicitly limited the effect of 
unions on employment to differences in the per- 
cent organized from SMSA  to SMSA  . This is like 
constraining the union relative wage effect to be 
the same across SMSAs, which may be inapprop- 
riate for theoretical and econometric reasons. 
Recent theoretical work by Iazear 
(1983) suggests that the percent unionized in 
an industry or region is not a good measure of 
union power. He shows that to the degree the 
cost of running a union differs across industries, 
different wage/employment  packages are nego- 
tiated by unions facing the same opportunity 
locus or having the same strength. That is, 
unions in industries where costs are high tend 
to prefer higher wage/lower employment share 
packages than unions in relatively low-cost 
markets. Consequently, the percent of employ- 
ment that is unionized or the union wage pre- 
mium varies across industries or regions, even 
though union power is the same. 
Greater union strength is indi- 
cated by a better wage/employment  share pack- 
age, not just a higher percent unionized. Con- 
sequently, it is necessary to control for both the 
wage premium and the percent unionized to 
get a measure of union strength across markets. 
To the degree the union relative wage effect dif- 
fers across SMSAs, failure to control for differences 
in the wage premium will yield inefficient and  7 
potentially biased estimates. Since the union 
wage premium may be determined by many of 
the same exogenous variables that determine 
employment, this term is likely to be  correlated 
with the independent variables in the model. 
The result may indicate that the estimated coef- 
ficients in previous studies are biased. 
To construct our measure of 
union strength, it was first necessary to derive 
an estimate of the union/nonunion wage differ- 
ential in each SMSk To do  this, we estimated 
separate wage equations for union and non- 
union members in each SMSA: 
where W,, is average hourly earnings of indi- 
vidual, i, in SMSA,  k, Xik is a vector of individual 
characteristics that determine wages, and ei  is an 
error term. In estimating these wage equations, 
we included controls for schooling, experience, 
17 
Because the multiplicative form places strong restrictions on 
Beginning in 1981, the CPS reduced the number of surveyed  how the percent organized, k,  and the union wage premium, 
one-quarter of the sample each month. As a result, there were fewer  using several other constructions of the union strength variable. In par- 
than 30 union members in many of the SMSAs in any given month.  ticular, we estimated an eauation where these terms were entered 
16 
We restrict our sample to the nonfarm economy when 
calculating both the union wage premium and the percent of 
employed who are union members. The sample was restricted to civili- 
ans age 16 to 65,  worhing for wages and salary. 
separately and equations with multiplicative indexes that rise more than 
proportionately with changes in the percent unionized (zk /(1 - K))  or 
with the union wage premium (zzk).  Because of  their qualitative nature, 
our results were not sensitive to the use of these other indexes. 
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experience squared, occupation, industry, race, 
gender and full-time, veterans, and marital sta- 
tus.I8  From equation (6) the union/nonunion 
wage differential for each SMSA,  z, , was calcu- 
lated as: 
where p, represents the estimated coefficients 
from the union or nonunion wage regression 
and Xis the mean value of the individual char- 
acteristics in each SMSA. 
This procedure treats union status 
as exogenous when estimating the union wage 
premium. Work by Heckman (1978), Duncan 
and Leigh (1985), and others suggests that this 
may yield biased estimates of the "true" union 
wage effect because it ignores the selectivity 
problem associated with the joint determination 
of union membership and the union wage pre- 
mium. Work by Freeman and Medoff (1981) 
and Freeman (1984), however, suggests that 
current econometric techniques for addressing 
this problem suffer from extreme sensitivity to 
changes in sample period or model specifica- 
tion. Consequently, they have argued against 
using such corrections as the inverse of the 
Mills ratio in estimating this differential and, 
instead, advocate using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) estimates, which do not appear to suffer 
from these problems. 
Because we are only interested in 
the effect of variations in the size of this pre- 
mium on employment and not in its level per 
se, we have chosen to use the estimates from 
these OLS regressions. Although a selectivity 
bias may mean that the estimated wage differen- 
tials are biased upwards, unless the selectivity 
bias varies across SMSAs in a way that is corre- 
lated with the error term in our employment 
equation, the employment equations should 
yield unbiased estimates of the effect of union 
strength on employment.'g 
In examining potential disem- 
ployment effects of unions, we attempted to 
control for other factors besides unionism that 
18 
Since the respondents were only asked their union status 
and the earnings questions in the last month of their rotation 
in the CPS sample, we also included monthly dummies to control for 
seasonal variations. 
Obviously, to the degree this is not true, the selectivity bias 
from the wage equation will be canied into the employment 
equation biasing these coefficients. Thus, it may be that our estimates 
provide an upper boundary on the size of the employment effect of 
unions. 
may shift either the supply or demand for labor, 
and hence, affect the likelihood of an individual 
being employed. Included in the model are 
controls for shifts in local demand or supply of 
labor, such as the unemployment rate in the 
SMSA, the size of the population, and the pro- 
portion of the population receiving AFDC. 
The effect of differences in the 
level of human capital are captured by controls 
for the number of years of schooling and labor 
market experience, while race and sex dummies 
are included to capture the effect of differences 
in tastes or discrimination. Finally, nine regional 
dummies are included to control for omitted 
factors that potentially vary across regions of the 
c~untry.~O  The resultant employment equation 
can be written as: 
where EU is a dummy indicating employment 
status of the ith individual in the jth  SMSA, 
Yi,  is a vector of personal and SMSA-specific 
characteristics that affect the probability of being 
employed; UN, is the product of the percent 
organized in an SMSA  and the union/nonunion 
wage differential in that SMSk 
The results of estimating these 
linear probability employment equations for the 
employed workers and for part-time and full- 
time employed workers separately are pres- 
ented in table  The signs of the variables that 
control for local labor market conditons and 
individual characteristics are generally consist- 
ent with theoretical predictions. Increases in 
human capital (schooling and experience) and 
local demand (lower unemployment) lead to 
increases in the likelihood that an individual 
will be employed. Conversely, increases in the 
fraction of the population receiving AFDC  has a 
negative, albeit insignificant, effect on the like- 
lihood of being employed. As seen in regres- 
sion (I),  in table 1, increases in union strength 
have a negative and significant impact on the 
probability of being employed. 
.......................................... 
20 
We alsc included monthly dummies to control for seasonal 
variations in employment. 
There are several well-known problems with the linear  2 1  probability model having lo do  with heteroskedasticily and 
prediction that lie outside the 0-1 interval. Because of  the cost of esti- 
mating logit equations with a data set this large however, we have not 
attempted to estimate this model using maximum likelihood techniques. 
Nonetheless, the estimates from the linear probability model should be 
consistent. 
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Thus, the fraction of the popula- 
tion employed in an SMSA  is inversely related to 
the extent of unionism and to the union wage 
premium. The magnitude of this effect can be 
captured by calculating the change in the prob- 
ability of being employed for a base case or 
average worker when the value of the union 
strength variable changes by one standard devia- 
tion from its mean value.22 The expected 
probability of being employed declines from 
0.829 to 0.825 with this increase in union 
strength. On the other hand, the probability of 
the average worker in the SMSA  where union 
strength is highest (San Bernardino, CA) being 
employed is only about 2 percent less than it is 
if  that worker lived in the SMSA  where union 
strength is the least (Atlanta, GA).23  Thus, it 
would appear that changes in the extent of 
union strength have only a very limited impact 
on aggregate employment. 
Given this reduction in the prob- 
ability of gaining employment due to unionism, 
it is of interest to see if unionism also affects the 
length of the workweek for those who remain 
employed. If  unionism has no effect on hours 
worked, then the effect on the probability of 
working full time should be the same as it is on 
the likelihood of working part time. Conversely, 
if  employers cut their employees' hours, then 
the union variable should be positive in a 
regression where the dependent variable is the 
probability of working part time regression and 
negative in a regression  where the dependent 
variable is probability of working full time. In 
regression (2) the dependent variable equals 1 
if  an individual is employed full time and zero 
otherwise; in regression (3) the dependent var- 
iable equals 1 if an individual is employed part 
time and zero otherwise. 
We found that the union variable 
was negative and significant in the full-time 
employment equation, while it was positive but 
insignificant in the part-time employment equa- 
tion. In addition, both the point estimate and 
the degree of significance of the union strength 
variable are higher in the full-time equation 
than in the total employment equation. Using 
these estimated coefficients, a standard devia- 
22 
The  base-case worker is a single white male with 12.6  years 
of schooling, 18.5 years of experience who lives in the East- 
North-Central region of the United States in an SMSA with an unem- 
ployment rate of 9.4 percent in March, a population of  3,479,000  where 
5.5 percent of  the population receives AFDC, and the union strength var- 
iable equals 0.031. 
The  union strength variable equals 0.0367 in Cleveland and 
0.0016 in Atlanta. In Cleveland, the probability of being 
employed is 0.827, while it is 0.837 in Atlanta.  I  23 
tion increase in union strength leads to a 0.7 
percent reduction in the probability of being 
employed full time and a 1.5 percent increase in 
the probability of being employed part time.24  If 
our base-case worker lived in Cleveland, he 
would be approximately 2 percent less likely to 
be working full time, and 4 percent more likely 
to be working part time than if he lived in the 
lowest union strength SMSA  Thus, these results 
suggest that part of the disemployment effect of 
unions comes through reducing the number of 
hours worked on that job. 
As a further test of this hypothesis, 
we re-estimated the employment equation with 
the probability of working part time if  an indi- 
vidual was employed as the dependent variable. 
Unions may reduce the workweek by increasing 
the relative frequency of part-time jobs. As seen 
in regression (4), increases in union strength 
increase the fraction of employment that is part 
time. A standard deviation increase in union 
strength increases the likelihood of working 
part time for the base-case worker by about 3 
per~ent.~5  Given these estimates, the conditional 
probability that an average worker has a full- 
time job (as opposed to a part-time job) is  9 
about 8 percent less in the Cleveland SMSA  than 
in the lowest union strength SMSA  Thus, these 
estimates suggest that increases in union wages 
(or the percent organized) might have a bigger 
effect on hours worked per week or on the mix 
of full-time and part-time jobs than on the level 
of total employment. This shift toward more 
part-time jobs may occur because unionized 
workers are more likely to work full time than 
nonunion workers, and because unionized 
workers are more likely to accept layoffs than 
reduced hours.26 Thus, an increase in the cost of 
union labor will primarily cause a reduction in 
the number of full-time jobs in the union sector, 
because unionized workers tend not to engage 
in work-sharing arrangements to reduce hours 
worked. Some of the displaced workers, how- 
ever, will find employment in the nonunion 
sector where there are more part-time jobs. 
Employment will thus tend to fall by less than 
the drop in the number of full-time jobs. 
In section 11, it was shown that the 
disemployment effect of unions was a function 
of the elasticity of labor supply. The greater the 
elasticity of supply, the greater the disemploy- 
.......................................... 
1  24 
The probability of  being employed full time and part time for 
our  base-case workers is 0.707 and 0.104, respectively. 
25 
The probability that the job a worker has is a part-time one 
for  the base-case worker is 0,1429. 
See Freeman and Medoff (1984) for a discussion of this  2 6  issue. 
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the disemployment effect would be largest for 
groups with a weak labor force attachment or a 
high elasticity of labor supply. Teen-agers or 
young people may be more adversely affected 
than older workers, and females may suffer more 
than males. To test for differences in the disem- 
ployment effect across groups, we estimated 
separate employment equations for part-time 
and full-time workers by gender and age group. 
These results are presented in appendix I1 
The basic predictions of our the- 
ory seem to hold. Based on the point estimates 
from these regressions, we see that the disem- 
ployment effect of unions is smaller for prime- 
age males than for teen-agers or 20-to 24-year- 
old males. In fact, prime-age males do  not 
appear to be adversely affected by changes in 
union strength at all. This probably reflects their 
strong labor force attachment or the low elastic- 
ity of labor supply. Interestingly, the evidence 
does not support the hypothesis that teen-agers 
are more adversely affected than 20-to 24-year- 
olds. As expected, the disemployment effect of 
unionism is greater for prime-age females than 
for prime age males.27  In general, increases in 
either the union wage premium or the percent 
organized affect the workweek, or the likeli- 
hood of being employed part time, more for 
females than for males. 
IV. Conclusions and Implications 
Results of estimates of the effect of changes in 
union strength on the likelihood of being em- 
ployed are presented here. They suggest that in 
areas where the unionized percent of the labor 
force is large, or where the union/nonunion 
wage premium is large, workers are less likely 
to be employed. Besides affecting the number of 
workers employed, unions reduce the likelihood 
of an individual having a full-time job by altering 
the mix of part-time and full-time jobs in the 
economy. Thus, unions appear to adversely affect 
the average workweek for those who remained 
employed. These disemployment effects are felt 
mainly by females and young men, with little, if 
any, negative impact on prime-age males. 
This disemployment effect was 
quite small, however. Unionism has a larger 
effect on the mix of part-time and full-time 
employment (and hence the workweek) than 
on the number of jobs. All of these effects are 
.......................................... 
The adverse effect of unionism increases with age for 
females. Whether this reflects a greater attachment to the 
labor force is a question for further research.  1  27 
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dwarfed in importance by other factors: the state 
of the local labor market and the level of the 
individual's human capital, or skills. Changes in 
schooling, experience, and local labor market 
conditions have a much greater impact on the 
likelihood of being employed than does union- 
ism. For instance, a standard deviation increase 
in the number of years of schooling increases 
the likelihood of being employed for the base- 
case worker about 10.6 percent, while a stan- 
dard deviation increase in the number of years 
of potential labor market experience increases it 
by 36.6 per~ent.~8  Thus, a standard deviation 
change in these measures of human capital is 
approximately 10 to 30 times more important 
than a similar change in union strength. This 
result implies that differences in union wage 
differentials, or the percent organized, are not 
the primary cause of regional differences in 
employment rates. 
Data Appendix 
The data for this study come from the Current 
Population Survey 1983 and from the Bureau of 
Census, County and City Data Book, 1982. 
UN is the product of the percent unionized 
and the union wage premium in each SMSA. 
Unemployment Rate is the local unemploy- 
ment rate for all workers in the SMSA. 
Population is the number of people living in the 
SMSA. 
AFDC is the proportion of the population in 
the SMSA  receiving AFDC payments. 
Schooling is the number of years of schooling 
completed by the individual. 
Fxperience is calculated as Age -Schooling -6. 
Race is a dummy that equals 1 if the individ- 
ual is white. 
Sex is a dummy that equals 1 if the individual 
is a male. 
In addition to these variables, each regression 
contains a dummy term that equals 1 if the indi- 
vidual is married, nine regional dummies where 
the omitted catagory is the East-North-Central 
region and 11 monthly dummies to control for 
the month the individual was surveyed. The 
complete regression results are available from 
the author upon request. 
.......................................... 
1  28 
The standard deviation is 2.9  years for schooling and 14.4 
years for experience. 
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